MedCo: Enabling Secure and Privacy-Preserving Exploration of Distributed Clinical and Genomic Data by Raisaro, Jean Louis et al.
IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY AND BIOINFORMATICS 1
MEDCO: Enabling Secure and
Privacy-Preserving Exploration of Distributed
Clinical and Genomic Data
Jean Louis Raisaro, Juan Ramón Troncoso-Pastoriza, Mickaël Misbach, João Sá Sousa,
Sylvain Pradervand, Edoardo Missiaglia, Olivier Michielin, Bryan Ford and Jean-Pierre Hubaux
Abstract—The increasing number of health-data breaches is creating a complicated environment for medical-data sharing and,
consequently, for medical progress. Therefore, the development of new solutions that can reassure clinical sites by enabling
privacy-preserving sharing of sensitive medical data in compliance with stringent regulations (e.g., HIPAA, GDPR) is now more urgent
than ever. In this work, we introduce MedCo, the first operational system that enables a group of clinical sites to federate and
collectively protect their data in order to share them with external investigators without worrying about security and privacy concerns.
MedCo uses (a) collective homomorphic encryption to provide trust decentralization and end-to-end confidentiality protection, and (b)
obfuscation techniques to achieve formal notions of privacy, such as differential privacy. A critical feature of MedCo is that it is fully
integrated within the i2b2 (Informatics for Integrating Biology and the Bedside) framework, currently used in more than 300 hospitals
worldwide. Therefore, it is easily adoptable by clinical sites. We demonstrate MedCo’s practicality by testing it on data from The Cancer
Genome Atlas in a simulated network of three institutions. Its performance is comparable to the ones of SHRINE (networked i2b2),
which, in contrast, does not provide any data protection guarantee.
Index Terms—Secure data-sharing, homomorphic encryption, differential privacy, i2b2, distributed data, decentralized trust, genomic
privacy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
W ITH the increasing digitalization of clinical and ge-nomic information, data sharing is becoming the
keystone for realizing the promise of personalized medicine.
Several initiatives, such as the Patient-Centered Clinical
Research Network (PCORNet) [1] in the USA, eTRIKS/-
TranSMART [2] in the EU, the Swiss Personalized Health
Network (SPHN) [3] in Switzerland, and the Global Alliance
for Genomics and Health (GA4GH) [4], are laying down
the foundations for new biomedical research infrastructures
aimed at interconnecting (so far) siloed repositories of clini-
cal and genomic data. In this global ecosystem, the ability to
provide strong privacy and security guarantees in order to
comply with increasingly strict regulations (e.g., HIPAA [5]
in USA or the new GDPR [6] in EU) is crucial, yet extremely
challenging, to achieve.
Currently, there exist two main approaches for sharing
medical data. The first is the centralized approach (see
Figure 1(A)) typical of initiatives such as All of Us [7]
and Genomics England [8]. With this approach, data from
multiple institutions are brought together in a single and
centralized repository that can be accessed by researchers
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willing to run analysis on a unified dataset. The second
is the decentralized approach (see Figure 1(B)), where the
different institutions keep the data at their premises and
form an interoperable peer-to-peer network accessible by
researchers. PCORNet [1] and the Beacon Project of the
GA4GH [9] are examples of this second approach. Unfor-
tunately, both approaches to sharing medical data have
revealed intrinsic limitations that demonstrate why neither
of the two has already been fully adopted by the healthcare
sector.
On the one hand, the centralized approach provides un-
deniable advantages in terms of availability and flexibility,
although it introduces a single point of failure in the system
by accumulating all the trust on a single entity (i.e., the
data repository). Indeed, the security and confidentiality
of all the data rely on the ability of the central repository
to thwart both external (hackers) and internal (insiders)
attacks. Furthermore, as the number of health-data breaches
constantly increases [10], there is significant public pressure
on clinical sites to ensure that the privacy and security
of patients’ data can be properly protected, notably when
stored or processed by third parties. As a result, clinical
sites are worried about adopting the centralized approach
and outsourcing their data to a single central repository
(e.g., the cloud), especially when the data to be shared
is highly sensitive or identifying (e.g., genomic data). On
the other hand, the fully decentralized approach solves the
single-point-of-failure issue: clinical sites can individually
enforce local control on their own data by monitoring and
managing the different accesses. However, this decentral-
ization imposes substantial costs on the clinical sites, as
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they have to maintain an interoperable network, often with
very limited resources (both human and technical). For this
reason, the fully decentralized approach is also likely to
be unsustainable in the long run, especially for large scale
projects where multiple clinical sites are involved.
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Fig. 1: Comparison of approaches for sharing medical data.
(A) Centralized approach affected by the single-point-of-failure
problem. (B) Decentralized approach affected by high mainte-
nance costs (both technical and human). (C) Hybrid and secure
approach enabled by MedCo, where clinical sites can securely
outsource their data to the storage and processing unit (SPU) of
their choice.
In this paper, to address the challenge of achieving
privacy-preserving, secure and scalable data sharing we
introduce MedCo. MedCo is the first operational system
that enables hundreds of clinical sites to share their clin-
ical and genomic data through a hybrid or “somewhat”
decentralized approach that overcomes the limitations of
the approaches described above (see Figure 1). Instead of
concentrating the trust on a single central repository as
in the centralized approach, MedCo distributes the trust
among a set of different “storage and processing” units
to which clinical sites can securely outsource the storage
of their data. Together, the storage and processing units
form a secure, federated and interoperable network that
investigators can query for research purposes as if it were
a single unified database. MedCo enables each clinical site
to choose its preferred storage and processing unit in order
to offload the maintenance and availability costs that affect
the fully decentralized approach. Such a storage and pro-
cessing unit can be hosted either by the clinical site itself,
by a governmental institution, or by a private/public cloud
provider with whom the clinical site establishes a data-
use agreement. For example, a clinical site with enough
resources can have its own storage and processing unit
hosted at its premises. Whereas, a clinical site with lim-
ited resources could use a cloud provider of its choice.
Potentially, each country could have a national storage and
processing unit, e.g., administered by the government or
a not-profit organization, to which all clinical sites within
the same country can outsource their data. The different
national storage and processing units could then federate
to form an international, secure and distributed clinical
research network.
A critical advantage of MedCo , with respect to state-
of-the-art systems for sharing medical data, is its ability to
provide strong security guarantees to clinical sites willing
to safely outsource the storage of their data to potentially
untrusted storage and processing units. Indeed, MedCo en-
ables each site to encrypt its data with a shared key that
is collectively generated by all the storage and processing
units in the federation. As the encryption scheme used
by MedCo is additively homomorphic, investigators can
directly query and process the encrypted data stored at
different storage and processing units without the need
for decrypting them. This ensures end-to-end protection of
the data in the Anytrust adversary model. Only authorized
investigators can decrypt the result of a query/analysis and
none of the storage and processing units alone, even if
compromised, can decrypt the data stored at its premises.
Actually, in order to succeed and get access to the unen-
crypted data, an adversary would need to simultaneously
compromise all the storage and processing units in the
federation. Additionally, MedCo can also be configured to
minimize the risk of re-identification stemming from the
behavior of malicious or curious investigators that try to
abuse the querying system; this is achieved by providing
obfuscated results that provide formal and well-established
notions of privacy, e.g., differential privacy.
In order to ease its adoption in operational research
environments, we developed MedCo on top of existing and
well-established open-source technologies for clinical data
exploration, namely i2b2 [11] and SHRINE [12]. Currently,
i2b2 is used at more than 300 clinical sites worldwide. We
demonstrate the practicality of MedCo by testing it in a sim-
ulated federation of three clinical sites that outsource their
oncology data (both clinical and genomic) to three different
storage and processing units. We compare MedCo with a
standard deployment, based on i2b2 and SHRINE (that does
not provide any data protection guarantee) and we show
that MedCo’s performance overhead is practical.
In light of its low overhead, we believe that MedCo can
dramatically accelerate and automate IRB review processes
for sharing sensitive (and identifying) medical data with ex-
ternal researchers. Review processes can take several weeks,
if not months, to permit researchers to access the data,
and these processes are often denied because the necessary
privacy and security guarantees cannot be provided. As
such, MedCo paves the way to new and unexplored use-
cases where, for example, (i) researchers will be able to
securely query massive amounts of distributed clinical and
genetic data to obtain descriptive statistics indispensable
for generating new hypotheses in clinical research studies,
or (ii) clinicians will be able to find patients with similar
(possibly identifying) characteristics to those of the patient
under examination in order to take more informed decisions
in terms of diagnosis and treatment.
In summary, in this paper we make the following contri-
butions:
• We introduce MedCo, the first operational system en-
abling the sharing of sensitive clinical and genomic infor-
mation in a privacy-preserving, secure and scalable way.
This is the author's version of an article that has been published in this journal. Changes were made to this version by the publisher prior to publication.
The final version of record is available at  http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TCBB.2018.2854776
Copyright (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted. For any other purposes, permission must be obtained from the IEEE by emailing pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY AND BIOINFORMATICS 3
• We developed MedCo to be fully compatible with state-
of-the-art clinical research platforms such as i2b2 and
SHRINE, hence it can be seamlessly deployed by clinical
sites.
• We extensively tested MedCo in a simulated federation
of three sites, focusing on a clinical-oncology case with
tumor DNA data from The Cancer Genome Atlas, and we
demonstrated its practicality.
• We propose a new generic method to add dummy data
in order to mitigate frequency attacks that can target
the probabilistically encrypted data after they are trans-
formed to deterministically encrypted data for the sake of
enabling equality-matching queries.
2 RELATED WORK
Among the operational systems for sharing clinical or ge-
nomic information, SHRINE [12] (the networked version of
i2b2 [11]) and the GA4GH Beacon Network [13] are certainly
the most advanced and widespread. For example, SHRINE
is used in several PCORNet clinical data research networks.
However, as opposed to MedCo, they provide limited pri-
vacy guarantees (restricted to ad-hoc result obfuscation)
and no protection of data confidentiality besides standard
access control, thus significantly restraining the possibility
of outsourcing the storage and of processing of the data
to external parties in order to partially offload the costs
of maintaining an always-available interoperable network.
SHRINE provides an ad-hoc mechanism for obfuscating
query results and for locking-out investigators after a certain
number of queries, whereas MedCo features a privacy-
budget mechanism that achieves differential privacy. Con-
versely, the Beacon still suffers from risk of re-identification,
as none of the three practical strategies described in [14] has
been implemented yet.
To the best of our knowledge, there are two recent works
dealing with privacy-preserving queries in distributed med-
ical databases; they represent the two main alternatives to
the encryption-based approach followed in this work: The
first one, PRINCESS [15], is based on trusted hardware:
The sites encrypt all their data under AES-GCM (Advanced
Encryption Standard - Galois Counter Mode) and send
them to an enclave that runs in a central server, featuring
an Intel SGX processor; this server decrypts and processes
the sensitive data thus, enabling the secure computation of
statistical models. Compared to our work, PRINCESS can
be more versatile in terms of allowed computations, but it
presents a single point of failure (the central server), and
it centralizes all trust in the enclave and in the attestation
protocol provided by Intel. Furthermore, the memory re-
strictions of the enclave limit the scalability of the scheme,
requiring compression and batching techniques to enable
processing of large genomic data, for which MedCo scales
much better.
The other recent approach, SMCQL [16], is based on
secure two-party computation; it introduces a framework
for private data network queries on a federated database
of mutually distrustful parties. SMCQL features a secure
query executor that implements different types of queries
(e.g., merge, join, distinct) on the distributed database by
relying on garbled circuits and Oblivious RAM (ORAM)
techniques. Whereas this work features truly decentralized
trust, it does not scale well to scenarios with more than two
sites that are typical in medical contexts with a high number
of collaborating hospitals.
3 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly introduce the main cryptographic
concepts used throughout the paper.
3.1 Deterministic Encryption
Deterministic encryption (DTE) [17] is a special type of
encryption that preserves the equality property of the plain-
texts that, as opposed to probabilistic encryption, makes
ciphertexts indistinguishable and, a priori, unusable. Yet,
DTE also leaks this property; for a given plaintext and key,
DTE always produces the same ciphertext. More formally,
for A,B ⊆ Z with |A| ≤ |B|, a function f : A → B is
equality-preserving if for all i, j ∈ A, f(i) = f(j) iff i = j. We
say that an encryption scheme with plaintext and ciphertext
spaces D and R, respectively, is deterministic if EDTE(K, ·)
is an equality-preserving function from D to R for all K ∈ K
(where K is the key space).
DTE-based schemes have several advantages and are
mainly used in the context of encrypted database systems
(e.g., CryptDB [18]) as they enable relational databases to
perform equality searches on encrypted data in the same
way as they would operate on the plaintext data. As a
counterpart, they provide less security guarantees than
probabilistic encryption schemes, as they are vulnerable to
inference attacks due to the amount of information they
leak. Hence, their application has to be carefully assessed.
3.2 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption (HE) is a special type of encryp-
tion that supports computation on encrypted data. Homo-
morphic encryption is probabilistic and provides semantic
security, meaning that no adversary without the secret key
can compute any function of the plaintext from the cipher-
text. In 2009, Gentry [19] introduced for the first time a
special type of HE that enables arbitrary computations on
ciphertexts, called fully homomorphic encryption (FHE).
Despite its complete functionality, FHE is currently un-
practical, as it introduces huge computational and storage
overheads that make it unusable for real-world applications.
For this reason, many variations of FHE have been pro-
posed in the past few years, with the goal of improving
efficiency by sacrificing some flexibility. Such cryptosys-
tems are called practical homomorphic cryptosystems, and
according to their functionality, they can be classified as
additively homomorphic if they satisfy only the addition of
ciphertexts, multiplicatively homomorphic if they satisfy only
multiplication, or somewhat homomorphic if they support (a
limited number of) additions and multiplications.
In this paper, we use the additively homomorphic cryp-
tosystem ElGamal on Elliptic Curves, due to its low cipher-
text expansion and fast homomorphic operations.
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3.2.1 ElGamal On Elliptic Curves
The ElGamal cryptosystem on elliptic curves (EC-
ElGamal) is an asymmetric, probabilistic and additively-
homomorphic encryption scheme that achieves semantic
security, i.e., ciphertext indistinguishability. It enables ad-
ditions and multiplications by constants in the ciphertext
domain. As every asymmetric cryptosystem, EC-ElGamal
features three algorithms:
• Key generation: Let E denote an elliptic curve over the
prime field GF(p) and G its base point. Then, the secret
key can be defined as an integer k ∈ GF(p), and the
public key can be derived as K = kG.
• Encryption: Let m be an integer and M = mG its
mapping to the corresponding point on the curve E .
Then, the encryption of M with the public key K is
denoted as EK(M) = (C1, C2) = (rG,M+rK), where
r is a random nonce.
• Decryption: Given the ciphertext EK(M) = (C1, C2)
and the secret key k, the decryption algorithm com-
putes the original plaintext point as D(EK(M)) =
−kC1 + C2 = M . The original plaintext m is obtained
by inverting the mapping from the elliptic curve point
M .
Due to its additive homomorphism, EC-ElGamal enables
combining the encryptions of any two messages in order to
obtain an encrypted result that, when decrypted, equals the
sum of these two messages. More formally, let M1 and M2
be any two messages, and α and β be two scalars; then, we
have that αEK(M1) + βEK(M2) = EK(αM1 + βM2).
4 MEDCO ECOSYSTEM
In this section, we introduce the ecosystem in which
MedCo operates. We begin by describing the system and
threat models. We then define the goals of MedCo with
respect to privacy/security and functionality.
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Fig. 2: MedCo’s system and threat models.
4.1 System Model
We consider the system model depicted in Figure 2, where
several clinical sites (Si) want to collaborate in order to share
clinical and genomic data with investigators, but do not
want to rely on any central third party or authority for stor-
ing or managing their data. Moreover, because of the high
costs (both technical and human) for maintaining a fully
interoperable decentralized network and the increasing size
of the data, clinical sites want to securely outsource the stor-
age of their data to a preferred storage and processing unit
(SPUj). Each site can have its own SPU, or multiple sites
can share the same SPU. All SPUs are organized together
in a peer-to-peer network and form a collective authority.
SPUs are responsible for (i) securely storing the data of the
clinical sites and (ii) securely processing a request of an
authorized investigator that wants to explore clinical sites’
data for generating and validating new research hypotheses
or for identifying cohorts of interest, by finding the patients
that match specific inclusion/exclusion clinical and genetic
criteria across the whole network.
4.2 Threat Model
In this system model, we consider the following threats:
• Storage and processing units: We assume storage and pro-
cessing units to be honest-but-curious (HBC) parties. In-
deed, SPUs can be compromised by internal or external
adversaries that do not tamper with the data-sharing
protocol but can try to infer sensitive information about
the patients from the data stored at their premises and
from the data being processed during the protocol itself.
As a result, SPUs cannot be trusted by clinical sites and
they do not trust each other, either.
• Investigators: We assume investigators to be potentially
malicious-but-covert (MBC) adversaries. Indeed, an inves-
tigator can try to legitimately use the system in order
to infer sensitive information about the patients (without
being discovered) by performing consecutive queries and
exploiting the information leaked by the end-results. For
example, a malicious investigator with some background
information about a given individual can infer the pres-
ence of such individual into a sensitive cohort (e.g., pa-
tients who are HIV-positive) or even reconstruct a subset
of her medical record.
• Clinical sites: We assume clinical sites to be trusted parties.
Finally, we assume that investigators cannot collude with
SPUs, and that at least one SPU does not collude with the
others.
4.3 MedCo’s Goals
To meet end-users expectations and be compliant with
regulations, MedCo has the following goals with respect to
functionality and privacy/security features.
4.3.1 Functionality Goals
The purpose of MedCo is to enable investigators to se-
curely explore the clinical and genomic data stored at all
SPUs by the various clinical sites in the network. Therefore,
MedCo must provide the same functionalities as those pro-
vided by state-of-the-art distributed cohort explorers such
as SHRINE [12]:
• (F1) Cohort Exploration: An authorized investigator
should be able to obtain the number of patients per clinical
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site who satisfy a set of inclusion/exclusion clinical and
genetic criteria, optionally grouped by age, gender or eth-
nicity. More formally, MedCo must support SQL queries
such as
SELECT COUNT(patients)
FROM distributed_dataset
WHERE criteria_i AND/OR criteria_j
AND/OR ...
GROUP BY criteria_k;
• (F2) Cohort Selection: An authorized investigator should
be able to obtain the pseudonyms of the patients who
satisfy a set of inclusion/exclusion clinical and genetic
criteria at each clinical site. More formally, MedCo must
support SQL queries such as
SELECT patients
FROM distributed_dataset
WHERE criteria_i AND/OR criteria_j
AND/OR ...;
4.3.2 Security and Privacy Goals
MedCo must always provide the following privacy/security
features:
• (SP1) Trust Decentralization: There should be no single
point of failure in the system.
• (SP2) End-to-end Data Protection: The confidentiality of
the data stored at the SPUs must be protected at rest, in
transit and during computation. The data are encrypted
by the clinical site and the result of the query can be
decrypted only by the investigator issuing the query.
Depending on the access privileges of the investigator
querying the system, MedCo should be able to also provide
the following optional features (either one or both of them):
• (SP3) Unlinkability: The investigator must not be able to
trace a query response back to its original clinical site.
• (SP4) Result Obfuscation: The query result is obfuscated
in order to achieve formal privacy guarantees (e.g., differ-
ential privacy) and prevent re-identification.
5 MEDCO CORE ARCHITECTURE & PROTOCOLS
In this section, we provide a detailed description of MedCo.
We begin with a brief overview of the system architecture
and core querying protocol. Then, we describe in detail
the different steps of the system initialization and the data
ingestion phases. Finally, we describe the steps of the secure
querying protocol that enables an investigator to efficiently
query the distributed encrypted data stored at the different
storage and processing units.
5.1 General Overview
The main purpose of MedCo, whose architecture is depicted
in Figure 3, is to reassure clinical sites willing to share their
clinical and genomic data with investigators, by enabling
clinical sites to securely outsource the storage and process-
ing of their data to a set of potentially untrusted storage and
processing units. In order to achieve the privacy and secu-
rity goals mentioned in Section 4.3, MedCo enables SPUs
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Fig. 3: MedCo core architecture and secure query protocol
comprising of: ETL process (steps A, B, C); Query generation
(step 1); Query re-encryption (step 2); Local query processing
(step 3); Local result obfuscation (step 4); Distributed results
shuffling (step 5); Distributed results re-encryption (steps 6):
Results decryption (step 7).
to collectively generate an encryption key for an additively-
homomorphic encryption system1, used by clinical sites to
encrypt their data before leaving the local trusted zone
of the site. Through a set of secure distributed protocols,
MedCo enables the SPUs (i) to switch the encryption of the
data from probabilistic encryption to deterministic encryp-
tion in order to securely process equality-matching queries,
and (ii) to re-encrypt the query result from an encryption
with the collective public key to an encryption under the
investigator’s public key, so that (only) the investigator can
eventually decrypt the result. And, depending on the access
privileges of the investigator issuing the query, MedCo can
securely shuffle and/or obfuscate the query results in order
to achieve unlinkability and/or differential privacy, respec-
tively (see Section 4.3.2).
5.2 System Initialization
During the initialization of MedCo, each storage and pro-
cessing unit (SPUi) generates a pair of EC-ElGamal crypto-
graphic keys (ki,Ki), where Ki = Gki, along with a secret
si. Then, all SPUs combine their EC-ElGamal public keys in
order to generate a single collective public key K =
?
i Ki
that will be used by the different clinical sites to encrypt the
data to be outsourced.
5.3 Data Extraction Transformation and Loading
During the data-ingestion phase, i.e., extraction transfor-
mation and loading (ETL) phase, each clinical site extracts
patient-level data from its private EHR system or clini-
cal research data warehouse, and transforms the data in
order to fit the “star-schema” data model [20] used by
1. For performance reasons, in this work we use EC-ElGamal, but any
other additively homomorphic scheme can be used as well.
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MedCo. The star-schema data model is based on the Entity-
Attribute-Value (EAV) concept also used by widespread
clinical research systems such as i2b2 [11], where clinical
and genetic observations (or “facts”) about patients (e.g.,
diagnosis, medications, procedures, laboratory values and
genetic variants) are stored in a narrow table called “fact”
table. Observations are encoded by ontology concepts from
an extensible set of medical terminologies, e.g., the Inter-
national Classification of Disease (ICD) or the US National
Drug Code (NDC). In this data model, four other “dimen-
sion” tables further describe the patients’ data and meta-
data. For example, the “patient dimension” table contains
pseudonymized demographic information of the patients,
and the “visit dimension” table stores information about the
visit, such as its date and time and the type of provider.
In such a data model, the information that clinical sites
want to protect from potential honest-but-curious adver-
saries at the storage and processing units is represented
by the mapping between the patients in the database and
the set of their clinical and genomic observations stored
in the “fact” table that are considered to be sensitive or
identifying. In order to protect such mapping, each site
separately performs the following three steps:
A. Generation of Dummy Patients: Each site generates a
set of dummy patients with plausible clinical observations
specifically chosen so that the distribution of observations
across patients in the “fact” table is as close as possible to the
uniform distribution. We explain the rationale behind this
step in detail in Section 6. To distinguish the real patients
from the dummies, each site also generates a binary flag to
be appended to the demographic information in the “patient
dimension” table. Such flag is set to 1 for real patients and
to 0 for dummy patients.
B. Data Encryption: In order to break the link between the
patients and their sensitive observations in the “fact” table,
each site encrypts with the collective public key K the set
of ontology concepts that encode these observations along
with the patients’ binary flags. As EC-ElGamal is a prob-
abilistic encryption scheme, each clinical site obtains a set
of probabilistic ciphertexts that are totally indistinguishable
from each other.
C. Data Loading and Re-Encryption: After encryption,
each site uploads the encrypted data to the selected storage
and processing unit that immediately starts a Distributed
Deterministic Re-Encryption (DDR) protocol (the details of
this protocol are explained in Section 5.5) in which the
encrypted concepts are sent across the network of SPUs
so that their encryption is switched from probabilistic to
deterministic. This re-encryption is necessary for enabling
the secure processing of equality-matching queries (as those
defined in Section 4.3) that otherwise would be impossi-
ble with probabilistic ciphertexts. Due to the presence of
dummy patients, even if the deterministic nature of the
ciphertexts leaks the equality of the underlying plaintexts,
an honest-but-curious adversary is not able to perform a
frequency attack to distinguish ontology concepts based on
their frequency distribution. Dummy patients are indistin-
guishable from real patients, as long as the patients’ binary
flags are probabilistically encrypted.
5.4 Secure Query Protocol
We assume each investigator that uses MedCo has a pair
of EC-ElGamal cryptographic keys (kI ,KI) and, optionally,
is assigned an initial differential privacy budget I during
the registration phase. The purpose of such a budget is to
limit the number of queries an investigator with low priv-
ileges can run on the system, hence I -differential privacy
can be guaranteed. The proposed secure query protocol is
illustrated in Figure 3 and comprises the following steps:
1. Query Generation: The secure query protocol starts with
an authenticated and authorized investigator who wants to
obtain either the number of patients or the pseudonyms
of the patients who match a set of inclusion/exclusion
clinical and genetic criteria across the different clinical sites.
In clinical research, this procedure is called “cohort selec-
tion”. For this purpose, the investigator builds a query by
logically combining (i.e., through AND and OR operators)
a set of “sensitive” and “non-sensitive” concepts from a
common (i.e., shared across the different sites) ontology. The
“sensitive” concepts in the query are encrypted with the
collective public key K and the query is sent along with
the investigator’s public key KI to one of the storage and
processing units.
2. Query Re-Encryption: The SPU that receives the query
starts a Distributed Deterministic Re-Encryption (DDR) proto-
col (described in Section 5.5) in order to switch the encryp-
tion of the sensitive concepts in the query from probabilistic
to deterministic. Once the DDR protocol is over, the initial
SPU broadcasts the deterministic version of the query to the
other SPUs in the network.
3. Local Query Processing: Each SPU locally processes the
query by filtering the patients (both dummy and real) in
the “patient dimension” table whose observations in the
“fact” table (both the unencrypted and the deterministically
encrypted ones) match the concepts in the query. If the
query requests the list of matching patients’ pseudonyms,
each SPU returns the list of matching patients’ pseudonyms
along with the probabilistically encrypted binary flags.
If the query requests the number of matching patients,
each SPU homomorphically adds the matching-patients’
dummy flags and returns the encrypted result EK(Ri) =
EK(
?
j∈φ f
j
i ) =
?
j∈φEK(f
j
i ), where EK(f
j
i ) is the en-
crypted flag of the j-th patient in site Si and φ is the
set of patients matching the query. In the homomorphic
summation, the binary flags of the dummy patients have
a null contribution (i.e., EK(0)), hence the encrypted final
result corresponds to the actual number of real matching
patients.
4. Result Obfuscation: This step is optional and depends
on (i) the type of query and (ii) the investigator’s privileges.
In order to guarantee differential privacy, each SPU can
obfuscate the encrypted patient counts computed during the
previous step by homomorphically adding noise sampled
from a Laplacian distribution. More specifically, let q be
the privacy budget allocated for a given query q and μ be
the noise value drawn from a Laplacian distribution with
mean 0 and scale Δfq , where the sensitivityΔf is equal to 1,
due to Ri being a count. Then, the encrypted obfuscated
query result is obtained as EK(Rˆi) = EK(Ri + μ) =
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EK(Ri)+EK(μ). We note that the query result is released to
the investigator only if the investigator’s differential privacy
budget is enough for such a query, i.e., if I − q > 0.
5. Result Shuffling: This step is also optional and depends,
as the previous step, on (i) the type of query and (ii) the
investigator’s privileges. In order to break the link between
the encrypted (potentially obfuscated) query results gener-
ated at the different SPUs and the corresponding clinical
sites, the SPUs jointly run a Distributed Verifiable Shuffling
(DVS) protocol (described in Section 5.5) on the set of
encrypted patient counts. As a result, each SPU receives en-
crypted counts2, that might have been generated by another
SPU.
6. Result Re-Encryption: The query results securely com-
puted by each SPU are encrypted with the collective key
K ; to be decrypted by the investigator, each SPU runs
a Distributed Key Switching (DKS) protocol (described in
Section 5.5) that involves the other SPUs and switches the
encryption of the query results from an encryption with
K to an encryption with KI , the investigator’s public key.
After this, the newly encrypted query results are sent back
to the the SPU that initiated the protocol and then on to the
investigator.
7. Result Decryption: As the query results are encrypted
with KI , the investigator can use the corresponding se-
cret key kI to decrypt them and obtain the corresponding
plaintext values. If the query results are the list of pa-
tients’ pseudonyms along with the patients’ binary flag,
the investigator can simply rule out the dummy patients
by discarding those who have the flag set to zero.
5.5 Secure Sub-Protocols
The secure query protocol of MedCo is based on three secure
and distributed sub-protocols re-adapted from [21]. In this
section, we describe them in detail.
• Distributed Deterministic Re-Encryption (DDR) Proto-
col. The DDR protocol enables a set of SPUs to determinis-
tically re-encrypt data that are probabilistically encrypted
under the collective key generated by all SPUs, without
ever decrypting the data. The purpose of this protocol is to
enable equality-matching queries on probabilistically en-
crypted data that otherwise would not be possible. More
formally, let n be the number of SPUs in the network,
EK (M ) = (C1, C2) = (rG,M + rK) be the encryption
of a message M under the collective public key K . The
DDR protocol comprises two rounds through all SPUs. In
the first round, each SPUi sequentially uses its secret si
and adds siG to C2. After this first round, the resulting
ciphertext is (C˜1,0, C˜2,0) = (rG,M + rK +
?n
i=1 siG).
In the second round, each SPU partially and sequentially
modifies this ciphertext. More specifically, when SPUi
receives the modified ciphertext (C˜1,i−1, C˜2,i−1) from
SPUi−1, it computes (C˜1,i, C˜2,i), where C˜1,i = siC˜1,i−1
and C˜2,i = si
?
C˜2,i−1 − C˜1,i−1ki
?
. At the end of the
second round, the deterministic re-encryption is obtained
2. The number of encrypted counts received by an SPU corresponds
to the number of sites that have outsourced the storage of their data to
that SPU.
by keeping only the second component of the resulting
ciphertext DTs(M) = C2,n = sM +
?n
i=1 sisG, where
s =
?n
i=1 si is the collective secret corresponding to the
product of each SPU’s secret.
• Distributed Verifiable Shuffling (DVS) Protocol. The
DVS protocol enables a set of SPUs to sequentially shuf-
fle probabilistically encrypted data so that the outputs
cannot be linked back to the original ciphertexts. More
specifically, the DVS protocol uses the Neff shuffle [22].
It takes as input multiple sequences of EC-ElGamal
pairs (C1,i,j , C2,i,j) forming a a × b matrix, and outputs
a shuffled matrix of (C¯1,i,j , C¯2,i,j) pairs such that for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ a and 1 ≤ j ≤ b, (C¯1,i,j , C¯2,i,j) =
(C1,π(i),j + r

π(i),jB,C2,π(i),j + r

π(i),jP ), where r

i,j is a
re-randomization factor, π is a permutation and P is a
public key.
• Distributed Key Switching (DKS) Protocol. The DKS
protocol enables a set of SPUs to convert a ciphertext
generated with the collective public key K into a ci-
phertext of the same data generated under any known
public key U , without ever decrypting them. The DKS
protocol never makes use of decryption. Let EK (M ) =
(C1, C2) = (rG,M + rK) be the encryption of a message
M with the collective public key K . The DKS protocol
starts with a modified ciphertext tuple (C˜1,0, C˜2,0) =
(0, C2). Then, each SPU partially and sequentially mod-
ifies this element by generating a fresh random nonce vi
and computing (C˜1,i, C˜2,i) where C˜1,i = C˜1,i−1 + viG
and C˜2,i = C˜2,i−1 − kiC1 + viU . The resulting ciphertext
corresponds to the message m encrypted under the public
key U , (C˜1,n, C˜2,n) = (vG,M + vU) from the original
ciphertext (C1, C2), where v = v1 + . . .+ vn.
6 DUMMY-ADDITION STRATEGIES
For cohort-exploration queries, the deterministic encryption
of the ontology concepts applied during the ETL phase
(see Section 5.3) avoids dictionary attacks by any subset of
colluding HBC SPUs due to the distribution of the secrets
si used in the DDR protocol. Nevertheless, a generation-
of-dummy-patients step is required prior to encryption in
order to avoid leaking to the SPUs (i) the ontology concepts
distribution and (ii) the query result. In this section, we
analyze the optimal dummy-generation strategy to achieve
this goal.
We assume, without loss of generality, that each patient
has a different set of observations; if there were equal
patients in the database, fake ontology concepts could be
added to make them different. The leakage to HBC SPUs
can be estimated by calculating (i) the adversary’s equivo-
cation (i.e., conditional entropy) on the ontology concepts
of the “fact” table given their tagged versions, as an av-
erage measure, and (ii) the smallest anonymity set of the
ontology concepts, as a worst-case measure. The higher the
equivocation and the larger the anonymity set is, the lower
the leakage is. For this exposition, we will focus only on
the relation between patients and occurrences of sensitive
ontology concepts, leaving aside the temporal dimension.
This is a simplifying assumption, implying that (a) either
there are no causality relations between concepts, or the time
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Ontology code a b c d e →σo(.)→ Tagged x y z r s dummy flag
real patients
pid1 1 1 1 1 0 σp(.) pa 1 1 1 0 1 E(1)
pid2 0 1 1 1 1 pb 1 1 1 1 0 E(0)
pid3 1 0 1 1 1 pc 1 0 1 1 1 E(1)
dummy patients
pid4 1 1 0 1 1 pd 0 1 1 1 1 E(0)
pid5 1 1 1 0 1 pe 1 1 0 1 1 E(1)
←−M −→ ←−M ′ −→
Fig. 4: Toy example. Ontology concepts mapping to real and added dummy patients with pseudo-identifiers pidi, and ontology
concepts a, b, c, d, e. pa, pb, pc, pd, pe are the randomly sorted version of the patient pseudo-identifiers, and x, y, z, r, s are the
shuffled and deterministically re-encrypted version of the ontology concepts. The binary flag is a probabilistic encryption of 1 for
real patients and 0 for dummies.
dimension is encrypted or not available in the database,
and that (b) the non-sensitive non-encrypted concepts are
independent of the encrypted ones; if this is not the case,
dependent concepts should be reclassified as sensitive and
be encrypted. We will follow the toy example shown in
Figure 4. This figure represents the (horizontally) folded
version of the (vertical) “fact” table, therefore coding each
patient as a row, each ontology concept as a column, and
each observed (resp. unobserved) concept in a patient as a
“1” (resp. “0”) in the corresponding cell.
More formally, let us define the matrix that associates
ontology concepts with patients as the tuple of a random
binary matrix M, where each row can be either a real
or a dummy patient, and each column represents one
ontology concept and two functions σp and σo, which
map the patient pseudo-identifiers (pidj in Fig. 4) to the
rows (pa, pb, pc, pd, pe in Fig. 4), and the observed ontology
concepts (a, b, c, d, e in Fig. 4) to the columns (x, y, z, r, s
in Fig. 4), respectively. These maps represent the shuf-
fling applied to patients before they are assigned their
pseudo-identifiers, and the shuffling and deterministic re-
encryption applied to ontology concepts before they are
loaded into the SPU’s database. In order to focus on
the practical leakage of the deterministically encrypted
database, let us assume that the deterministic re-encryption
of the concepts and the probabilistic encryption of the pa-
tients’ binary flags do not leak anything about their inputs
(their trapdoors cannot be broken), even if they are based on
computational guarantees. Therefore, the adversary (each of
the SPUs) observes the realization of the row- and column-
permuted matrix: A ≡ [M = M ], and her equivocation,
with respect to the original information given A, can be
expressed as
H(M,σo,σp|A) = H(M|σo,σp,A) (1)
+H(σo|σp,A) +H(σp|A)
(a)
= H(σo|σp,A) +H(σp|A) (2)
(b)
≤ H(σo|A) +H(σp)
(c)
≤ H(σo) +H(σp).
Expression (1) can be divided in three terms: the first repre-
sents the entropy of M conditioned to the two permutations
and the observed contents of the cells, which is fully de-
terministic, hence zero-entropy (step (a) in (2)); the second
term is the entropy of the ontology concepts permutation
conditioned to the observation of the matrix cells and the
patient permutation, and the third term is the entropy of
the patient permutation conditioned on the observed matrix
contents. We aim at maximizing these two terms.
The last term of the equivocation can be maximized by
making the dummy patients indistinguishable from the real
patients, i.e., drawn from the same distribution. Empirically,
this means that all the patients, real or dummy, have the
same type of distribution, and the contents of the rows
are independent of the position of the dummy patients in
the list. This also makes the two permutations independent
of each other even when conditioned on the contents of
M  (step (b) in (2)). In our toy example in Fig. 4, all the
real patients’ rows belong to the same type (weight 4); by
generating two new dummy patients with the same weight,
they become indistinguishable from real patients in our
simplified example.
In order to maximize the entropy of the ontology con-
cepts mapping σo conditioned on A (step (c) in (2)), all the
permutations have to be equiprobable for the given M .
This is achieved by flattening the joint distribution of the
observed ontology concepts through the added dummies;
the geometric interpretation of this flattening is that any
column permutation can be cancelled out by a row permu-
tation, such that it is not possible to univocally map any
ontology concept to any column in M . In our toy example,
it can be seen that due to the two added dummies, any fixed
query yields the same number of patients independently of
the permutation applied to the query terms, which gives a
complete indistinguishability between all the deterministi-
cally encrypted ontology concepts even in light of the matrix
M . It must be noted that the unobserved concepts do not
have to be added to the table, as the adversary does not
have a priori knowledge of which is the subset of observed
concepts, only its cardinality. Also, this strategy fully breaks
the correlation between ontology concepts; for example, if
the site added only one dummy patient with concepts a, b, e
to the real patients in Figure 4 the individual appearance
rate of the concepts would be flattened, but it would leak
that there is a correlation between the concepts c and d, that
could be identified in the encrypted matrix through an lp-
optimization attack [23].
The last bound in (2) is the best that clinical sites can
do with the dummy-patient addition strategy, knowing the
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matrix of real patients; it maximizes the uncertainty of
the attacker about the original ontology concepts, for any
real distribution of patients and ontology concepts. The
corresponding practical dummy-addition strategy can be
described as follows: Real rows are grouped according to
their weight (number of observations); if the whole set of
observed ontology concepts has n elements, for each group
of rows of weight k < n, dummy rows are added to
complete all the k-combinations of n elements, producing?
n
k
?
rows (counting both real and dummies) per group.
In our toy example, (considering independent concepts) the
equivocation goes from 3.58 bits with no dummies to 10.23
bits with the two dummies, and the minimum anonymity
set raises from 2 to 5.
This strategy guarantees the maximum uncertainty for
the adversary for an arbitrary real distribution of concepts
across patients, but it generates a combinatorial number
of dummies, which is not feasible in general (unless the
number of observed concepts is very low). But if some
assumptions can be made about the concepts joint distribu-
tion, we can simplify the strategy. If dependencies are only
found within small groups of concepts, the groups being
mutually independent (this is the case for genomic infor-
mation and dependencies found inside subsets of localized
variants), it is possible to constrain the needed number of
dummies by applying the same dummy-addition strategy
in a restricted block-wise fashion. In order to flatten only
the histogram of group weights, we group the concepts in
independent blocks of size n  n and apply the dummy-
generation permutation to the blocks (inter-block), but not to
the contents of each block, until the block distribution is flat,
therefore reducing the needed number of dummy rows. This
trade-off strategy creates an “anonymity set” of ontology
concepts of size n/n in such a way that the adversary can-
not distinguish between the set of concepts inside different
blocks. The drawback is that the equivocation is reduced,
as the resulting joint distribution of the ontology concepts
is only flat across blocks, but not inside each block. In the
worst case in terms of leakage (fully correlated concepts
within each block), the achievable adversary’s equivocation
becomes H(M,σo,σp|A) = H(σo|σp,A) + H(σp|A) ≤
H(σo,n/n?) +H(σp), where σo,n/n? are the permutations of
the n/n blocks of n concepts each. This bound is achieved
when the blocks are mutually independent, hence the best
partitioning strategy consists in keeping correlated concepts
inside the same block. If fully independence between con-
cepts can be assumed (n = 1), it can be seen that flattening
the observations histogram leads to the same maximum
attacker equivocation as the complete permutation strategy
(Eq. (2)), but with a much lower number of added dummies.
In order to further reduce this number, it is possible to set
a minimum anonymity set size m for the concepts and add
dummies to water fill the observation histogram (block-wise
flat, instead of fully flat) until each concept has at least other
m− 1 concepts featuring the same number of observations.
Finally, it must be noted that whenever a site’s database
is updated, dummies can be regenerated (and encryptions
re-randomized) when the ETL process (see Section 5.3) is
run again for the whole updated database. The DDR proto-
col uses a different fresh randomness, so that the concepts
from the updated database cannot be linked back to the
concepts of the old one.
7 PRIVACY & SECURITY ANALYSIS AND EXTEN-
SIONS (MEDCO+)
The main privacy and security goals for MedCo are summa-
rized in Section 4.3. In this section, we briefly discuss and
analyze the fulfillment of these targets for MedCo, and we
revisit possible extensions for more stringent requirements.
Security in MedCo is based on the cryptographic guaran-
tees provided by the underlying decentralized sub-protocols
described in Section 5.5. All input sensitive data are either
deterministically (ontology concepts) or probabilistically
(patients’ binary flags) encrypted with collectively main-
tained keys, such that they cannot be decrypted without
the cooperation of all sites, thus guaranteeing confidentiality
and avoiding single points of failure (SP1 in Section 4.3). For
the full step-by-step security analysis of the distributed sub-
protocols, we refer the reader to [21]. Following this analy-
sis, paired with the dummy strategy described in Section 6,
it can be seen that MedCo covers the unlinkability require-
ment (SP3 in Section 4.3) for the query results, thanks to the
DVS protocol; and it protects their confidentiality, as only
the authorized investigator can decrypt the query results
thanks to the DKS protocol (SP2 in Section 4.3). Conversely,
to avoid re-identification (or attribute disclosure) attacks
(SP4 in Section 4.3), MedCo also enables the application of
differentially private noise to the results and, due to the
proposed dummy strategy, it guarantees confidentiality of
the data also against all the SPUs that participate in the
system (SP2 in Section 4.3).
There are two extensions that can be applied to
MedCo in order to satisfy additional confidentiality and
integrity requirements: guaranteeing unlinkability among
investigators’ queries, and obtaining protection against (po-
tentially) malicious SPUs.
- Query confidentiality: In the basic MedCo system pre-
sented in Section 5, HBC SPUs can link the ontology con-
cepts used across different queries, as the deterministically
encrypted values of the same concepts are the same for
all the queries. In the case that query confidentiality is
also a requirement (e.g., investigators from pharmaceutical
companies), it is possible to address it by probabilistically
encrypting ontology concepts during the ETL phase and
by deterministically re-encrypting the obtained ciphertexts
with a fresh secret for each new query. Then, the effective
encryption key is different for each fresh run of the DDR
protocol, so it is not possible to link the query terms between
different runs of the shuffling-DDR. When this modified sys-
tem (which we denote MedCo+) is paired with the proposed
dummy-addition strategy, the terms between queries are
indistinguishable and unlinkable, at the cost of transferring
and re-encrypting at runtime the encrypted database of each
site.
- Malicious SPUs: MedCo’s threat model assumes HBC
SPUs to be a credible and plausible assumption, based on
the damage to reputation that a SPU would suffer if it mis-
behaves in a collective data-sharing protocol. Nevertheless,
it is possible to cope with malicious SPUs by using proof
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generation protocols [21] that produce and publish zero-
knowledge proofs for all the computations performed at
the SPUs, hence the proofs can be verified by any entity
in order to assess that no SPU deviated from the correct
behavior. This solution yields a hardened and resilient query
protocol, but the cost of producing all proofs results in
a typically unacceptable burden in common data sharing
applications, for which the basic proposed MedCo covers all
fundamental privacy and security requirements and yields a
very competitive performance, as shown in the next Section.
8 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We implemented and tested MedCo on a clinical oncology
use-case by simulating a network of three clinical sites, each
one outsourcing the storage of their data to a different SPU.
8.1 Implementation
To ease its adoption at clinical sites, we implemented
MedCo as three components that fully integrate within
the i2b2 [11] framework and its networking system
SHRINE [12]. i2b2 (Informatics for Integrating Biology and
the Bedside) (i2b2) is the state-of-the-art clinical platform
for enabling secondary use of electronic health records
(EHR) [11]. It is currently used at more than 300 medical
institutions, covering the data of more than 250 million
patients. Its back-end consists of a set of server-side software
modules implemented in Java, called “cells”, that are re-
sponsible for the business logic of the platform and are orga-
nized in a “hive”. The i2b2 data model is based on the “star
schema” [20]. Queries are built in a dedicated JavaScript-
based Web-client by logically combining ontology concepts
organized in a hierarchical tree-based structure. The three
components of MedCo are:
• A new i2b2 server cell, called “MedCo cell”, developed
in Java and Go. The MedCo cell is responsible for the
execution of the secure query protocol and communicates
with the other i2b2 cells through a REST API. We used the
UnLynx library [21] to implement the DDR, DVS and DKS
secure distributed sub-protocols.
• A new i2b2 Web-client plugin developed in JavaScript.
The plugin is responsible for managing the cryptographic
operations in the browser.
• A data importation tool, developed in Go, that is respon-
sible for encrypting the sensitive ontology concepts and
generating the dummy patients.
These components are publicly available at [24]. We note
that MedCo is not limited to i2b2/SHRINE but can also
be integrated on top of other state-of-the-art platforms for
clinical and translational research, such as TranSMART [2],
in order to make them secure and distributed.
8.2 Oncology Use-Case
The lack of privacy and security guarantees of existing tools
makes sharing sensitive oncological data outside the trusted
boundaries of clinical sites extremely difficult, if not impos-
sible. For this reason, we tested MedCo on genomic and
clinical data from The Cancer Genome Atlas (TCGA) [25]
by performing typical queries for oncogenomics. We report
here two representative examples:
- Query A: Number of patients with skin cutaneous melanoma
AND a mutation in BRAF gene affecting the protein at position
600. About half of melanoma patients harbor a mutation
in the BRAF gene at position V600E or V600K and can be
treated by the BRAF inhibitor vemurafenib [26]. The propor-
tion of mutated BRAF melanoma is therefore an important
benchmark for a clinic or hospital.
- Query B: Number of patients skin cutaneous melanoma AND
a mutation in BRAF gene AND a mutation in (PTEN OR
CDKN2A OR MAP2K1 OR MAP2K2 genes). This query is
based on the fact that patients treated with vemurafenib
develop resistance through mutations that activate the MAP
kinase pathways [27]. When facing drug resistance, finding
another patient with a similar mutation profile could bring
invaluable information for clinical decisions.
We used genomic and clinical data of 8,000 cancer pa-
tients, 9 clinical attributes, and an average of 142 genetic
mutations per patient (more than 1 million observations in
total). We imported these data from the Mutation Annota-
tion Format (MAF) into the i2b2 “star schema” data model.
Each mutation is represented as a code comprising the
concatenation of its chromosome, position, reference allele
and tumor allele. Clinical attributes are encoded with the
ICD-10 [28] and ICD-O [29] international terminologies.
8.3 Experimental Setup
The initial testing environment comprises 3 servers inter-
connected by 10 Gbps links and featuring two Intel Xeon
E5-2680 v3 CPUs @2.5 GHz that support 24 threads on 12
cores, and 256 GB RAM. Each server represents an SPU and
hosts the i2b2/SHRINE Web client with the MedCo plugin,
the i2b2 hive including the SHRINE components, the new
MedCo cell, and the i2b2 database implemented in Post-
greSQL. In order to test MedCo’s scalability, we increase the
number of servers up to 9 (see setup S3 below). To set up our
system and facilitate its deployment, we use Docker [30].
To evaluate MedCo’s performance, we consider five
different experimental setups, with each measurement av-
eraged over 10 independent runs, and show MedCo’s com-
putational and storage overhead with respect to an unpro-
tected i2b2/SHRINE deployment:
S1. ETL runtime for increasing dataset size: We analyze
the amount of time needed to extract, transform and load
the data (pre-processing), which includes the formatting,
the initial probabilistic encryption, the deterministic re-
encryption of sensitive ontology concepts, and the loading
of the data in the i2b2 database.
S2. Query runtime breakdown: We run queries A and B
(see Section 8.2) on a federation of 3 SPUs, each storing the
full initial dataset (i.e., around 1 million observations on
8,000 patients at each SPU), and report the query-runtime
breakdowns for each step of the secure query protocol.
S3. Query runtime for increasing dataset size: We run
queries A and B (see Section 8.2) on a federation of 3 SPUs in
order to study MedCo’s scalability with respect to increasing
dataset sizes.
S4. Query runtime overhead for increasing number of
SPUs: We run queries A and B (see Section 8.2) on a
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federation with an increasing number of SPUs, each storing
the whole initial dataset.
S5. Network traffic for varying query size: We study the
amount of network traffic inter-SPU for queries with an
increasing number of ontology concepts.
8.4 Performance Results
In the following, we report the performance results for
the aforementioned use-cases and experimental setups. We
show MedCo’s computational and storage overhead with
respect to an unprotected i2b2/SHRINE deployment.
As shown in Figure 5, the ETL phase (setup S1) is a
costly operation in MedCo. We can distinguish two separate
subphases: (i) the processing of the ontology (including the
parsing, the encryption and the distributed deterministic re-
encryption), which only depends linearly on the size of the
ontology and is usually constant, and (ii) the processing
of patients’ observations, which depends linearly on the
number of observations/patients but does not involve any
costly encryption operation hence it is much faster than
the ontology processing. We note that the ETL phase is
performed only once and can be significantly optimized
through parallel computing. If new data need to be added
after the first importation, there is no need to re-process the
ontology again.
Figure 6 provides query-runtime breakdowns for both
query A and query B (setup S2). The times for query-parsing
and encryption/decryption in the Web client, broadcasting
the query across the different SPUs, and result obfuscation
are all negligible, so we do not account for them. Unexpect-
edly, results show that the standard i2b2 query to the central
“fact” table is the most expensive operation in MedCo,
as it depends on the total number of observations in the
database. In this case, each SPU stores approximately 1 mil-
lion observations (both genomic and clinical) per affiliated
clinical site (one site per SPU in our setting). This time is also
linear in the number of ontology concepts used in the query
Fig. 5: ETL time vs database size for experimental setup S1.
(a) Query A
(b) Query B
Fig. 6: Query-runtime breakdown for queries A and B in a
network with three sites and three SPUs for experimental setup
S2. The vertical black line signals the point where each node
has to wait for the others before it can proceed.
(96 for query A and 281 for query B) and it is inherent to the
standard i2b2 database management for SQL-queries to the
“fact” table. The times for fetching the encrypted patients’
binary flags from the “patient dimension” table and the
homomorphic aggregation (Step 3 in the query workflow)
depend linearly on the number of patients satisfying the
query criteria and can be extremely fast for rare ontology
concepts or rare combinations of concepts. For example, for
queries A and B, homomorphic aggregation takes around
30 and 8 milliseconds respectively, as only around 32 and
7 patients per site satisfy the query criteria. Differently, the
deterministic re-encryption time is linear in the number of
sensitive concepts in the query and number of SPUs in the
network, as each probabilistically encrypted concept has to
be sequentially modified by each SPU. Such a process takes
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(a) Query A runtime vs database size. (b) Query B runtime vs database size.
(c) Queries A and B runtime vs number of SPUs. (d) Network traffic vs query size
Fig. 7: MedCo’s performance results for experimental setups S3-S5.
less time for query A than for query B, as they respectively
comprise 96 (95 mutations and 1 clinical attribute) and 281
(280 mutations and 1 clinical attribute) query attributes.
The remaining secure distributed operations introduced by
MedCo depend on the number of SPUs in the network, but
they are negligible, as they involve only one ciphertext, i.e.,
the encrypted query result.
Figure 7 shows the performance results for setups S3-
S5. The measurements are averaged out between SPUs. For
setup S3 (Subfig. 7a and Subfig. 7b), in order to study
MedCo’s ability to scale with increasing database sizes,
we randomly sample patients from the original dataset of
8k patients and create smaller datasets of 1k, 2k and 4k
patients per site. For setups S4 and S5 (Subfig. 7c and
Subfig. 7d), we use the initial dataset (8k patients). Results
show that MedCo is extremely efficient and performance-
wise comparable to the insecure i2b2/SHRINE deployment.
MedCo’s overhead only depends on the number of sensitive
concepts in the query, the number of matching patients satis-
fying the research criteria and, marginally, on the number of
SPUs in the network. As shown in Subfigure 7c, the number
of SPUs affects only the time needed by the distributed pro-
tocols to deterministically re-encrypt the sensitive ontology
concepts in the query and to re-encrypt the query end-result
under the investigator’s key.
In Subfigures 7a, 7b and 7c, we can also observe that
MedCo+ has a relatively higher runtime cost as a coun-
terpart for achieving query unlinkability, because all the
observations in the “fact” table of each SPUs have to be
deterministically re-encrypted on the fly by the whole set of
SPUs for each new query. This is confirmed by Subfigure 7d
where the network traffic is significant and almost constant
for MedCo+, whereas for MedCo it is almost negligible and
it increases with the number of concepts in the query. We
note, however, that the privacy enhancements brought by
MedCo+ might be necessary only under specific circum-
stances (e.g., when an investigator from a pharmaceutical
company is using the system).
Finally, the storage overhead introduced by encryption
affects only the “concept dimension” table that stores the
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ontology, and it is in the order of 4x, as MedCo’s de-
terministic re-encryption converts each ontology concept,
represented by 64-bit integers, into a 32-bytes ciphertext.
Depending on the specific distribution of ontology codes
across patients, a varying number of dummy patients must
also be considered. In the tested oncology use-case, we
assume independent codes and follow the dummy-addition
strategy described in Section 6. As a result, we obtain an
increase factor of 3.6x.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented MedCo, the first op-
erational scalable system that enables secure sharing of
sensitive medical data, which so far was impossible due
to the low security guarantees of existing operational sys-
tems. MedCo relies on secure distributed protocols and a
new dummy-records addition strategy that enables different
privacy/security vs. efficiency trade-offs. With its generic
architecture, MedCo is easily deployable on top of existing
health information systems such as i2b2 or tranSMART.
Finally, results on a clinical oncology use-case have shown
practical query-response times and good scalability with
respect to the number of sites and amount of data. Therefore,
we firmly believe that MedCo represents a concrete solution
for fostering medical data sharing in a privacy-conscious
and regulatory-compliant way.
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